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1. Introduction
In a simple two-country model and in a world without risk, long-run effects of capital
market integration, on capital-importing and capital-exporting countries have been stud-
ied in several specifics cases. Ruffin (1979) shows that in Solow’s model, where each
country saves a constant fraction of total income (wages and profits), each country would
gain over the long-run in wealth per capita. This theorem, in no way surprising, is anal-
ogous to the usual result of gains from trade. More surprising, Quibria (1985) shows
that the capital-importing country, if it saves a constant fraction of its profits (asset in-
come), loses in terms of wealth per capita. Darreau and Pigalle (2014) show that the
capital-exporting country, if it saves a constant fraction of its wages, loses in terms of
stationary utility level. The support of saving (wages or profit) seems the essential ingre-
dient to determine whether the integration of the capital market is profitable or not, in
the long term. We construct a model that allows us to generalize this result. We show
that the capital-exporting country wins if it saves a constant fraction of its profits, and
that capital-importing country wins if it saves a constant fraction of its wages. Generally
for the integration of the capital market to be profitable, it is necessary for savings to
be proportional to income which increases through the integration of the capital market:
wages of the borrower, and profit of the lender.
Section 2 present the model, section 3 determines the steady state of each country,
section 4 explores different cases depending on whether the savings is on total income or
wages or profits, and section 5 generalizes the result.
2. The model
Consider a world composed of two economies, ”Hat” and ”Tilde”. Denote the relative size
of hat country in the world by ηˆ = Nˆ/(N˜ + Nˆ). To model both the assumptions of a
”two-country model” and the assumption of a ”small open economy” we assume that the
populations are different sizes η˜ 6= ηˆ ∈ (0, 1). Wealth per capita of each country’s agents
a = A/N is composed of domestic capital and net foreign loans. k = K/N is domestic
capital per capita and e = E/N is the Net International Investment Position per capita.
aˆ = kˆ + eˆ and a˜ = k˜ + e˜ (1)
To obtain a steady state, it is necessary that the rate of population growth n be the
same in each country. Assume for simplicity that the two countries have the same level of
technology A, the same depreciation rate of capital δ, and the same production function.
The production function satisfies constant returns to scale and the usual neoclassical
conditions, like in Solow’s model :
qˆ = f [aˆ− eˆ] and q˜ = f [a˜− e˜] (2)
f ′ > 0; f ′′ < 0; f ′(0) = +∞; f ′(∞) = 0 (3)
Capital market integration implies the equalization of interest rates R = r + δ, and
since we have the same production function, the egalization of capital and wage rates.
By construction, we have the equality of NIIP (Eˆ = −E˜) since net lending by one is net
borrowing by the other.
f ′ [aˆ− eˆ] = R = f ′ [a˜− e˜] (4)
kˆ = k = k˜ (5)
f [aˆ− eˆ]−R · (aˆ− eˆ) = w = f [a˜− e˜]−R · (a˜− e˜) (6)
ηˆeˆ = −η˜e˜ (7)
It is important to distinguish between financial capital a (wealth) and productive
capital k and to distinguish GDP q and GNP y = q +Re = w +Rk +Re = w +Ra.
Like Ruffin we assume that the dynamic part of the story comes from Solow. Each
country saves a constant fraction of its income. But in contrast to Ruffin, we assume
that labor income savings and capital income savings can be done at different rates,
respectively sw and sa, some of which may be zero. Wealth accumulation equations are
given by :
{
Daˆ = sˆww + sˆaRaˆ− (n+ δ) aˆ
Da˜ = s˜ww + s˜aRa˜− (n+ δ) a˜
(8)
Equations (8) determine the course of the economic system through time. We now
determine the wealth of nations at steady state.
3. The steady state
We examine the existence, uniqueness and stability of steady state in a phase diagram.
We simply need to represent the Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 locus in (a˜, aˆ) wealth space. For
this, we need a point through which passes Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 and we need slope of
Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0.
A natural point for the Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 locus in (a˜, aˆ) wealth space is autarky.
In autarky, we have eˆ = 0. The converse is not true and the eˆ = 0 curve in (a˜, aˆ) space,
also represents all (a˜, aˆ) consistent with zero capital movement under free capital mobility.
The eˆ = 0 curve comes from equation (4) with eˆ = 0 and is upward sloping, because an
increase in aˆ must entail an increase in a˜ to eliminate the incentive for capital to migrate.
This is a straight line at a 45 degree angle because of our hypothesis of same production
function. Below the eˆ = 0 curve, eˆ will be positive, the Hat country will be the creditor
eˆ > 0 and Tilde country will be the debtor e˜ < 0.
Back to autarky, we assume that aˆautarky > a˜autarky and we obtain the two points when
eˆ = 0 and in autarky: point B for the Hat country and point C for the Tilde country.
In autarky Daˆ is independent of a˜ like Da˜ is independent of aˆ. Thus Daˆ = 0 is vertical
and Da˜ = 0 is horizontal. Thus point A is the steady state in (a˜, aˆ) wealth space under
autarky.
0eˆ = 0eˆ < 0
eˆ > 0
a˜
aˆ
A b
B b
Cb
Daˆ = 0
Da˜ = 0
aˆAutarky
a˜Autarky
Figure 1: Autarky case
Next, we determine the slope of Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 under free capital mobility.
Implicit differentiation of (8) will yield to :
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
∂Daˆ
∂aˆ
∂Daˆ
∂a˜
and
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂Da˜
∂aˆ
∂Da˜
∂a˜
It is shown in Appendix 1 how the slopes of Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 are obtained:
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (aˆ− eˆ) + sˆaaˆ] + sˆaR− (n+ δ)
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (a˜− e˜) + sˆaaˆ]
(9)
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−s˜w (aˆ− eˆ) + s˜aa˜]
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[s˜aa˜− s˜w (a˜− e˜)] + s˜aR− (n+ δ)
(10)
These equations are the general form of several special cases according the values of
sw and sa. We now represent phase diagrams in different cases.
4. Different cases
4.1. Ruffin case : sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and s˜a = s˜w = s˜
In his seminal paper, Ruffin (1979) supposes as in Solow’s model that sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and
s˜a = s˜w = s˜. Substituting in (9) and (10) we obtain the equations found by Ruffin (23
and 24 pp. 835) :
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
sˆ
(
R + ∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
− (n+ δ)
sˆ η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
and
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
=
s˜∂R
∂aˆ
(
ηˆ
η˜
eˆ
)
s˜
(
R− ∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
− (n+ δ)
The first equation indicates that Daˆ = 0 has a negative slope for eˆ > 0. Indeed for
eˆ > 0 the denominator is negative since ∂R/∂aˆ < 0. The numerator is negative as shown
in Appendix 2.
The second equation indicates that Da˜ = 0 has a positive slope for eˆ > 0. Indeed for
eˆ > 0 the numerator is negative since ∂R/∂aˆ < 0. The denominator is negative as shown
in Appendix 2.
We represent in Fig. 2 the curves Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0. Curve Daˆ = 0 passes through
point B (the steady state in autarky for the Hat country), has a negative slope for eˆ > 0
and a positive slope for eˆ < 0. Curve Da˜ = 0 passes through point C (the steady state
in autarky for the Tilde country), has a positive slope for eˆ > 0 and a negative slope for
eˆ < 0. In the region eˆ > 0, the two curves have opposites slopes. This guarantees the
uniqueness of the steady state S.
0
eˆ = 0
a˜
aˆ
A
b
B b
Cb
aˆAutarky
a˜Autarky
a˜Free Mobility
aˆFree Mobility
Daˆ = 0
Da˜ = 0
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Figure 2: Ruffin case
To understand the dynamic in Fig 2, start from point A (the steady state in the two
countries under autarky) and let free capital mobility. Point A is in the area where eˆ > 0
this implies that capital will migrate to the Tilde country. Point A is below Da˜ = 0
which implies that Da˜ > 0. Point A is on the left of Daˆ = 0 which implies that Daˆ > 0.
The global economy converges to point S. Point S is the stable steady state with perfect
capital mobility.
The important result of this analysis is the following : Capital market integration led
to increase the per capita wealth of both countries under the Ruffin’s assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Ruffin 1979) : When sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and s˜a = s˜w = s˜, the steady-state
solution for wealth per capita with free capital market, is better than the autarky solution.
Both countries would gain over the long-run with perfect free capital mobility. But
this unsurprising theorem is disputed by Quibria (1986).
Note that under the assumption of a small open economy (η˜ → 0, ηˆ → 1), the curve
Daˆ = 0 tends towards the vertical, the curve Da˜ = 0 is steeper1, and only the small
country (Tilde) wins from capital market integration. Under the assumption (η˜ → 1, ηˆ →
0), the curve Da˜ = 0 tends towards horizontal, only the small country (Hat) wins from
capital market integration.
4.2. Quibria case : sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and s˜w = 0
Quibria (1986) suppose that the poor country (the South in his paper, here Tilde) saves
only from profits sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and s˜w = 0. Substituting in (9) and (10) we obtain the
equations (11 and 12 pp. 367) found by Quibria .
1To calculate the slope of Da˜ = 0 use (11) and (7) in Appendix 1 .
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
sˆ
(
R + ∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
− (n+ δ)
sˆ η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
and
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
s˜aa˜
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
s˜aa˜+ s˜aR− (n+ δ)
= −
ηˆ
η˜
Since in the steady state s˜aR = (n+ δ), the second equation shows that Da˜ = 0 has
a negative slope equal to −ηˆ/η˜ (-1 in Quibria which suppose countries of same size).
As in the case of Ruffin, the first equation shows that Daˆ = 0 has a negative slope for
eˆ > 0. This slope is greater in absolute value than the slope of Da˜ = 0 since sˆ(w/aˆ) > 0)
and η˜sˆeˆR′ < 0.
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
ηˆ
η˜
sˆ
(
R + ∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
− (n+ δ)
sˆ∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
= −
ηˆ
η˜
+
ηˆ
η˜
(n+ δ)− sˆR
sˆηˆR′eˆ
= −
ηˆ
η˜
+
sˆ (w/aˆ)
η˜sˆeˆR′
< −
ηˆ
η˜
The same analysis as before allows us to represent the Quibria case and unique and
stable steady state S.
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Figure 3: Quibria case
The surprising result of Quibria is that the borrower country (Tilde) lost from opening
its capital market : a˜free mobility < a˜autarky.
Theorem 2 (Quibria 1986) : When sˆa = sˆw = sˆ and s˜w = 0, the steady-state solution
for wealth per capita with free capital market, is better than the autarky solution for the
lender country (Hat), but is worse than the autarky solution for the borrowing country
(Tilde).
4.3. Darreau Pigalle case : sˆa = s˜a = 0
Darreau and Pigalle (2014) show that in the overlapping generations model (OLG), both
countries increase their stationary utility levels only if the autarky solutions are on op-
posites sides of the golden rule. When the two countries are in dynamic efficiency, the
lender country suffers a decline in its stationary utility level under free capital market
compared to autarky. A feature of the OLG model is that savings are a fraction of wages,
therefore sˆa = s˜a = 0. Substituting in (9) and (10) we obtain :
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (aˆ− eˆ)]− (n+ δ)
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (a˜− e˜)]
=
w
aˆ
− ∂w
∂aˆ
∂w
∂a˜
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−s˜w (aˆ− eˆ)]
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[−s˜w (a˜− e˜)]− (n+ δ)
=
∂w
∂aˆ
w
a˜
− ∂w
∂a˜
We use (13) and (14) and the condition of steady-state (n+ δ) = sˆw (w/aˆ) = s˜w (w/a˜).
Both slopes are positive if w
a
> ∂w
∂a
which is the case if capital and labor are sufficiently
substitutable (see Appendix 3). The two equations have positive slopes, pass through the
points B and C, and intersect at point S as in the following figure. The same analysis as
before allows us to represent the Darreau-Pigalle case and the unique and stable steady
state S.
0
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Figure 4: Darreau-Pigalle case
The surprising result of Darreau-Pigalle (2014) is that the lender country (Hat) loses
from opening its capital market : aˆfree mobility < aˆautarky.
Theorem 3 : When sˆa = s˜a = 0, the steady-state solution for the wealth of nations with
free capital market, is better than the autarky solution for the borrowing country (Tilde)
but is worse than the autarky solution for the lender country (Hat).
Note that under the assumption of a small open economy (η˜ → 0, ηˆ → 1), the curve
Daˆ = 0 tends towards the vertical and the curve Da˜ = 0 is steeper2. Only the small
country (Tilde) wins from capital market integration. Under the assumption (η˜ → 1, ηˆ →
0), the curve Da˜ = 0 tends towards the horizontal and only the small country (Hat) loses
to capital market integration.
4.4. Everyone loses case : sˆa = 0, s˜w = 0
The Quibria and Darreau-Pigalle cases suggest combination of them. Substituting sˆa =
0, s˜w = 0 in (9) and (10) we obtain:
2To calculate the slope of Da˜ = 0 use (11) and (7).
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
=
w
aˆ
− ∂w
∂aˆ
∂w
∂a˜
and
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
ηˆ
η˜
Daˆ = 0 has a positive slope and Da˜ = 0 has a negative slope.
0
eˆ = 0
a˜
aˆaˆAutarky
a˜Autarky
aˆFree Mobility
a˜Free Mobility
S
b
Ab
B b
Cb
Daˆ = 0
Da˜ = 0
Figure 5: Everyone loses case
In the unique and stable steady state S, the Hat country and the Tilde country are
both poorest.
Theorem 4 : When sˆa = 0, s˜w = 0 the steady-state solution for wealth per capita with
free capital market, is worse than the autarky solution for the lender country (Hat) and
for the borrowing country (Tilde).
5. Discussion
It has been shown that the capital-importing country wins if it saves a constant fraction
of its wages and that the capital-exporting country wins if it saves a constant fraction of
its profits. Conversely the capital-exporting country loses if it saves a constant fraction
of its wages, and the capital-importing country loses if it saves a constant fraction of its
profits.
For the capital-exporting country, it is clear (see a proof in Ruffin 1979, theorem 2)
that free capital mobility lowers wages and raises profits (in short and long run) compared
to autarky. The contribution of this paper is to show that, if savings are a fraction of
wages, savings will decrease for the capital-exporting country, which explains why its
wealth decreases. If savings are a fraction of the profits, savings will increase for the
capital-exporting country, which explains why its wealth increases.
For the capital-importing country, free capital mobility raises wages and lowers profits
(at least in the short run in Quibria and Everyone loses cases) compared to autarky. If
savings are a fraction of wages, savings and wealth will increase. If savings are a fraction
of profits, savings and wealth will decrease.
The free capital market increases the wealth of nations in previous cases, only if savings
are proportional to income which increases through the integration of the capital market:
wages of the borrower, and profit of the lender. More generally, since S = sww + saRa
and ∂S
∂R
= sw ∂w
∂R
+ saa+ sa ∂a
∂R
R = sw (−k)+ saa+ saa
(
∂a
∂R
R
a
)
= sw (−k)+ saa (1 + ε), it is
a general result that ∂S
∂R
> 0⇔ s
a
sw
> k
a(1+ε)
where ε is the elasticity of wealth relative to
the interest rate. Savings and wealth increase as a result of an increase in interest rate
if the savings rate on profits is high relative to the savings rate on wages. Savings and
wealth increase as a result of an decrease in interest rate if the savings rate on profits is
low relative to the savings rate on wages. The free capital market increases the wealth of
nations in Solow’s model, for lender countries if and only if s
a
sw
> k
a(1+ε)
and for borrowing
countries if and only if s
a
sw
< k
a(1+ε)
.
6. Conclusion
When the free capital market is not justified by risk sharing as in the financial literature,
its effects on the wealth of nations are far from being systematically positive. This elusive
gains from international financial integration, to use the expression of Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006), is a curious result, empirically but also theoretically.
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Appendix 1
The Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 slopes are calculated in the plane (a˜, aˆ). For this we need to
calculate ∂Da/∂a, and before that ∂R/∂a and ∂w/∂a.
• Computing ∂R/∂a:
From both side of(4) we have : ∂R
∂aˆ
= R′
(
1− ∂eˆ
∂aˆ
)
= R′
(
− ∂e˜
∂aˆ
)
From (7) we have ∂eˆ
∂aˆ
= − η˜
ηˆ
∂e˜
∂aˆ
We obtain ∂eˆ
∂aˆ
= η˜ thus:
∂R
∂aˆ
= ηˆR′ < 0 (11)
With (4): ∂R
∂a˜
= R′
(
− ∂eˆ
∂a˜
)
= R′
(
1− ∂e˜
∂a˜
)
and (7) ∂eˆ
∂a˜
= − η˜
ηˆ
∂e˜
∂a˜
.
We obtain ∂e˜
∂a˜
= ηˆ, thus:
∂R
∂a˜
=
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(12)
• Computing ∂w/∂a :
From (6) we obtain:
∂w
∂aˆ
=
(
1−
∂eˆ
∂aˆ
)
R−
(
∂R
∂aˆ
(aˆ− eˆ) +R
(
1−
∂eˆ
∂aˆ
))
thus:
∂w
∂aˆ
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
(aˆ− eˆ) > 0 (13)
∂w
∂a˜
=
(
1−
∂e˜
∂a˜
)
R−
(
∂R
∂a˜
(a˜− e˜) +R
(
1−
∂e˜
∂a˜
))
thus:
∂w
∂a˜
= −
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(a˜− e˜) > 0 (14)
• Computing ∂Da/∂a:
∂Daˆ
∂aˆ
= sˆw
∂w
∂aˆ
+ sˆa
∂R
∂aˆ
aˆ+ sˆaR− (n+ δ)
= −sˆw
∂R
∂aˆ
(aˆ− eˆ) + sˆa
∂R
∂aˆ
aˆ+ sˆaR− (n+ δ)
=
∂R
∂aˆ
(−sˆw (aˆ− eˆ) + sˆaaˆ) + sˆaR− (n+ δ)
(15)
∂Daˆ
∂a˜
= sˆw
∂w
∂a˜
+ sˆa
∂R
∂a˜
aˆ
= −sˆw
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(a˜− e˜) + sˆa
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
aˆ
=
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(−sˆw (a˜− e˜) + sˆaaˆ)
(16)
∂Da˜
∂aˆ
= s˜w
∂w
∂aˆ
+ s˜a
∂R
∂aˆ
a˜ =
∂R
∂aˆ
(−s˜w (aˆ− eˆ) + s˜aa˜) (17)
∂Da˜
∂a˜
= s˜w
∂w
∂a˜
+ s˜a
∂R
∂a˜
a˜+ s˜aR− (n+ δ)
= −s˜w
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(a˜− e˜) + s˜a
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
a˜+ s˜aR− (n+ δ)
=
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(s˜aa˜− s˜w (a˜− e˜)) + s˜aR− (n+ δ)
(18)
• Calculation of slope Daˆ = 0 and Da˜ = 0 in (a˜, aˆ) space:
Implicit differentiation of (8) will yield to :
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
∂Daˆ
∂aˆ
∂Daˆ
∂a˜
and
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂Da˜
∂aˆ
∂Da˜
∂a˜
With (15) and (16), the slope of Daˆ = 0 is:
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Daˆ=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (aˆ− eˆ) + sˆaaˆ] + sˆaR− (n+ δ)
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[−sˆw (a˜− e˜) + sˆaaˆ]
with (17) and (18) the slope Da˜ = 0 is:
da˜
daˆ
∣∣∣∣
Da˜=0
= −
∂R
∂aˆ
[−s˜w (aˆ− eˆ) + s˜aa˜]
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
[s˜aa˜− s˜w (a˜− e˜)] + s˜aR− (n+ δ)
Appendix 2
yˆ = f [aˆ− eˆ] +Reˆ⇒
∂yˆ
∂aˆ
= R +
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
y˜ = f [a˜− e˜] +Re˜⇒
∂y˜
∂a˜
= R +
∂R
∂a˜
e˜ = R +
η˜
ηˆ
∂R
∂aˆ
(
−
ηˆ
η˜
eˆ
)
= R−
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
As with Ruffin, let the marginal social product of labor be positive.
∂Yˆ
∂Lˆ
= yˆ−aˆ
∂yˆ
∂aˆ
> 0 ⇒ yˆ−Raˆ−
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆaˆ =
(n+ δ) aˆ
sˆ
−Raˆ−
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆaˆ > 0⇒ (n+ δ) > sˆ
(
R +
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
∂Y˜
∂L˜
= y˜−a˜
∂y˜
∂a˜
> 0⇒ y˜−Ra˜+
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆa˜ =
(n+ δ) a˜
s˜
−Ra˜+
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆa˜ > 0 (n+ δ) > s˜
(
R−
∂R
∂aˆ
eˆ
)
Appendix 3
We show the condition for positive slope (for Daˆ = 0), on the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor.
A.3.1) Since w = f(k)− kf ′(k) we have ∂w
∂k
= f ′(k)− [f ′(k) + f ′′(k).k] = −f ′′(k).k
A.3.2) The elasticity of substitution is defined as σ(k) = d ln(K/L)
d ln(FL/FK)
. Under constant
returns to scale this can be written as σ(k) = FKFL
FKL.F
= − f
′(k).w
f ′′(k)kf(k)
Thus −f ′′(k)k = f
′(k).w
σ(k)f(k)
or with our notations −R′k = R.w
σ(k).q
A.3.3) Equations (11) and (13) imply : ∂w
∂aˆ
= −∂R
∂aˆ
(aˆ− eˆ) = −ηˆR′k
Thus w
aˆ
> ∂w
∂aˆ
⇔ w
aˆ
> −ηˆR′k, and with (A.3.2) result, w
aˆ
> ηˆ Rw
σ(k).q
⇔ σ(k) > ηˆRaˆ
q
⇔
σ(k) > Rk
q
ηˆaˆ
k
⇔ σ(k) > Rk
q
ηˆaˆ
η˜a˜+ηˆaˆ
Thus
w
aˆ
>
∂w
∂aˆ
⇔ σ(k) > α(k).pˆ(k)
The condition (for Daˆ = 0 have a positive slope) is that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is higher than the share of capital in GDP multiplied by the
share of the Hat country in wealth per capita in the world. The right-hand side is less
than one. The left hand side is equal to one (σ = 1) for the Cobb-Douglas production
function. The general condition is that capital and labor are sufficiently substitutable.
For example, if K and L are complementary (σ = 0), an export of capital will lead to a
decrease in L such that k is constant. Then w is constant and the Hat country’s savings
do not fall.
